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MAKING CONSTITUTIONS, FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER 
Alison Quentin­Baxter * 
I LEARNING THE TRADE 
I have been asked to present a paper about making constitutions, and, as a tribute to that 
lawyer of many parts, Sir Ivor Richardson, whose distinguished and varied career we are 
celebrating at this conference, to do so, from my own perspective as a lawyer.  That happens to 
be the lawyer as constitutional adviser. 
I learnt something about the practical operation of a constitution when, as a new graduate, I 
worked in the Legal Division of the Department of External Affairs, now the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.  In those days, the Department of External Affairs doubled as the 
Prime Ministers Department and often advised on constitutional, as well as international, 
issues.  In this, the year of the Queen's Golden Jubilee, I remember how, in my early days in my 
new job, I was asked to do a good deal of research into what New Zealand had to do to 
recognise the accession to the throne of a new sovereign ­ an area of expertise that, fortunately, 
has not had to be called upon since.  But as a result of this and other experiences, I have always 
felt that the two disciplines, international law and constitutional law, inform and enrich one 
another. 
Later in my career, I became a constitutional law teacher for a time at Victoria University of 
Wellington.  For some of that time, Professor Ivor Richardson was Dean of Law.  This was one 
of the many capacities in which he has made such a distinguished contribution to the life of the 
law in New Zealand, and elsewhere.  As one small example of his versatility, I should like to 
mention that, in discussing with my students the ways in which ­ before the passing of the 
* Director of the New Zealand Law Commission from 1987 – 1994.  She has practiced as a Barrister from 
the early 1970's, and has been a consultant in the fields of international and constitutional law, 
working, in particular, with the State of Niue, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of 
Fiji.
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New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ­ effect was given in New Zealand law to human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, I drew on his 1962 Practice Note, Religion and the Law. 1 
I served my apprenticeship in constitution­making, as assistant to my late husband, 
Quentin, 2 with a recognised role but no official status.  In 1970, the New Zealand Government 
appointed him as Constitutional Adviser to the Niue Island Assembly.  Niue was still being 
administered as a New Zealand dependent territory, but its people had become confident 
enough at least, to consider eventual self­government, in a relationship of free association with 
New Zealand.  I accompanied Quentin to Niue, took a seat at the Assembly table, and went 
with him to village and other meetings.  His first report recommended that, before deciding to 
become self­governing, the people of Niue should try out in, practice, the constitutional 
arrangements they would need as a self­governing State. 3 This they did. 4 Three years later, 
they were ready to make a decision about their future status through an act of self­ 
determination. 
Quentin and I again visited Niue, this time to discuss what might need to go into an Act of 
the New Zealand Parliament declaring Niue to be self­governing, and an accompanying 
Constitution of Niue.  On our return, he began writing a second report and asked me to 
produce an outline of what might go into the constitution.  By the time Parliamentary Counsel, 
Jack McVeagh, had turned this document into a draft Bill for a Niue Constitution Act and 
scheduled Constitution, Quentin and I were in Geneva where he had a number of other 
responsibilities.  The drafting of the Act and Constitution was completed through our joint 
efforts in providing comments and suggested redrafts, in telexed exchanges with Wellington 
and Niue.  At one point, Quentin returned to New Zealand for consultations.  Niue became 
self­governing on 19 October 1974. 
News of this exercise in constitution­making must have travelled to other parts of the 
Pacific.  In 1977, when we were again in Geneva, a letter arrived from the Marshall Islands, 
then a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the United States.  It 
announced that a Constitutional Convention was shortly to begin in Majuro, the administrative 
1 Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson Religion and  the Law, Practice Note No 1 (Sweet & Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, 
Wellington, 1962). 
2 Professor Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter, Professor of Law at the Victoria University of Wellington. 
3 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of 
Niue (Community Development Office, Niue, 1971).  The Report was tabled in the New Zealand House 
of Representatives as [1971] AJHR A4, and was also published as UN Doc A/AC.109/378. 
4 As to the implementation of the recommendations in the Constitutional Adviser's report, see the Niue 
Amendment Act 1971, s 3 (repealing ss 5­14 of the principal Act and substituting new ss 5­14D), s 4 
(amendments consequential on s 3), and ss 5­12 (repealing and substituting or amending ss 30­32, 34, 
36, 41, 64, and 664 of the principal Act respectively).
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centre.  The Marshall Islands Leadership Group was interested in the possible adoption of the 
parliamentary system, under which a number of South Pacific States had become independent 
or self­governing.  Quentin was asked to be Counsel to the Convention and, if he wished, to 
bring his wife with him to share in the work.  He had to reply that he was unable to spare the 
time away from the University.  I ended up taking on the job alone, though with his full 
support.  I did, however, ask for the assistance of a good American constitutional lawyer on 
matters such as a Bill of Rights, of which I had no personal experience.  In due course, the 
Convention was able to obtain help from Professor Laurence Tribe, of Harvard University. 
Again, I learnt a lot from his involvement. 
The Constitution of what later became the Republic of the Marshall Islands entered into 
force on 1 May 1979.  Just over 10 years later, I returned to Majuro for another two months to 
act as Counsel to the 1990 Constitutional Convention which adopted a number of amendments, 
spelling out some aspects of the original Constitution, but not amending it in any significant 
way.  All the proposed amendments required a two­thirds majority in a referendum.  The only 
one to receive such a majority was the changing of the country's name.  I shall come back later 
to the Marshall Islands model of constitution­making and constitutional amendment. 
Another project on which I was engaged in the late 1970s, was the updating of a little­ 
known part of the New Zealand constitution, the Letters Patent constituting the Office of the 
Governor­General.  In April 1980, I completed a review of the existing Letters Patent of 1917. 5 
My report was the basis for new Letters Patent, which entered into force on 1 November 1983. 6 
A further large constitutional task came my way in May 1995.  I was appointed as one of 
two Counsel to a Commission of Inquiry set up to review the revolutionary 1990 Constitution 
of the Republic of Fiji.  My colleague as Counsel to the Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
(FCRC) was Jon Apted, a young Fijian public servant who had already acquired a reputation 
for his ability and independence as the Supervisor of Elections.  The FCRC was chaired by Sir 
Paul Reeves.  Its other members included Mr Tomasi Vakatora, a former Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Dr Brij Lal, Reader in Pacific Islands History at the Australian National 
University.  The FCRC's unanimous report was presented to the President on 6 September 
1996. 7 After consideration by a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee, it became the basis, 
though with some significant changes, for the new Constitution enacted by the Parliament of 
5 Alison Quentin­Baxter and Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter Review of the Letters Patent 1917 Constituting 
the Office of Governor­General of New Zealand: Report (The Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1980). 
6 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor­General of New Zealand 1983.  It took effect as at 28 
October 1983, SR 1983/225. 
7 Fiji Constitution Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 
34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996).
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Fiji in 1997. 8 That Constitution entered into force on 27 July 1998.  With the help of decisions of 
the Fiji Court of Appeal, it has survived an attempt to overthrow it by force, and, subsequently, 
a departure from one of its main provisions, though the consequences of the Court's decision 
that there has been such a departure are still to unfold. 9 
II THE SUM OF THE EXPERIENCE 
I have described my involvement in making constitutions, not just to tell you about some of 
the highlights in a varied professional life, but to set the scene for a discussion of constitution­ 
making that I hope will have some resonance for a New Zealand audience.  In this country, we 
do not now have a constitution that is supreme law, and therefore, is harder to change than the 
ordinary law.  The reluctance to contemplate such a constitution appears not to be due to the 
fact that we lived under one from 1840 until 1947.  Until then, only the United Kingdom 
Parliament could amend the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) in major ways, though 
it was fairly clear that it would do so only at New Zealand's request, and would not do so 
without such a request.  The 1947 patriation of the Constitution was regarded as a logical step, 
consistent with New Zealand's nationhood. 10 Little, if any thought, was given to the fact that 
our own Parliament would in future be able to change our constitution in the same way as any 
other law.  It soon did so, by abolishing the Legislative Council, New Zealand's second 
chamber. 11 That step, however, did not involve a significant shift in the allocation of political 
power. 
In 1986, the New Zealand Parliament replaced the 1852 Act with a more modern statute.  It, 
too, can be amended just as easily as any other Act of Parliament.  In the meantime, we have 
become more conscious that our constitutional arrangements are based on the fundamental 
constitutional settlement in the Treaty of Waitangi.  But there is not yet any widespread 
support in the community, as a whole, for the idea of giving the status of supreme law to the 
Treaty guarantees, and the jurisprudence to which they have given rise, or any other aspect of 
our constitution.  Even so, the question of constitution­making in New Zealand is raised from 
8 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji).  Although this Act was, in form, an Act to alter the 1990 
Constitution proclaimed by the interim revolutionary government, it was, in reality, a new, self­ 
contained constitution. Section 195 repealed all provisions of the 1990 Constitution, except Chapter 
XIV, which conferred immunity from prosecution on all who had taken part in the 1987 military 
coups.  Before its entry into force, the Constitution Amendment Act 1997 was itself amended in minor, 
and mainly, technical ways by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1998 (Fiji). 
9 See  The  Republic  of  Fiji  v  Prasad (11 March 2001) Fiji Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No 
ABU0078/2000S, and Chaudhry v Qarase and Ors, (15 February 2002) Fiji Court of Appeal, Misc.  No 
1/2001. 
10 See the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947, the New Zealand Constitution (Request and 
Consent) Act 1947, and the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (UK). 
11 See the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 1950.
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time­to­time.  For that reason, it seems useful to share with you some perceptions about both 
substance and process that may be relevant if we ever wish to take seriously the idea of giving 
ourselves a Constitution with a capital C. 
Drawing on my experiences as a constitutional adviser in the contexts earlier described, I 
therefore propose to discuss the following general issues: 
· When do countries make a new constitution? 
· The constitution as the rules of the political game. 
· How can a country make a constitution? 
· How does the method of constitution­making affect the tasks of the constitutional 
adviser? 
· Should the public be involved in constitution­making, and if so, how? 
· What goes into a constitution? 
· Is the Westminster constitution a satisfactory export model? 
· What are the responsibilities of a constitutional adviser? 
III WHEN DO COUNTRIES MAKE A NEW CONSTITUTION? 
It is a truism that countries make a new constitution when they wish to make a fresh start, 
usually for compelling political reasons.  In my experience, a new constitution, or the 
amendment of an existing constitution, generally involves a significant re­allocation of political 
or other powers.  Whether or not the new allocation is fairer, and therefore more justifiable 
than the old one, depends on what is in the old constitution, and also in the new or amended 
one, how the constitutional change is made, and perhaps on one's point of view. 
Constitution­making in Niue was an exercise in de­colonisation.  It involved the definitive 
transfer of executive and legislative power in respect of Niue from officials, Ministers, and 
Parliament in Wellington to the Niue Cabinet, and a newly constituted Niue Assembly.  You 
might think that there would be ready support for such a shift, but, especially in the beginning, 
not everyone in Niue was happy about the idea.  Some regarded New Zealand's controlling 
hand as a necessary protection against the power of their own political leaders.  Some were 
fearful that the withdrawal of New Zealand control would mean also the withdrawal of the 
New Zealand economic and administrative assistance on which Niue depended, and was 
likely to depend for the foreseeable future.  The Constitution contains assurances on both 
points, 12 but cannot, of itself, determine the kind or the level of continuing New Zealand 
12 On the first point, see in particular the Constitution of Niue, Articles 62(2), 67(1) and 69(1), as to the 
independence of the Niue Public Service, and article 35(1)(b)(i), which provides that Article 69 can be
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assistance.  Over the years, both have at times been in contention.  There is ongoing interest in 
Niue in the review of the Constitution, but, in my view, this interest mainly reflects a deeply 
felt desire to improve the working of the relationship with New Zealand. 
In the Marshall Islands, too, the objective was decolonisation, but with a twist.  The United 
States, as the administering authority, saw the future of the Marshall Islands as self­ 
government in federation with other groups in the Trust Territory, the Caroline Islands and 
Palau.  Political leaders in the Marshall Islands saw federation as a disadvantage.  First, there 
were no traditional ties between the people of the Marshall Islands and the peoples of the 
Carolines and Palau, who spoke different languages and were culturally distinct.  Secondly, 
the Marshall Islands had suffered considerable damage as a United States Strategic Trust 
Territory.  Several of its atolls had been made uninhabitable by their use for atmospheric 
nuclear testing, and the people of neighbouring atolls had been exposed to radioactive fallout. 
People felt that, if the Marshall Islands alone had to bear these burdens of United States 
administration, then they should not be required to share its benefits.  The missile­testing 
range at Kwajalein Atoll provided jobs and brought in substantial land rents.  Sharing the 
revenues from this activity through federation would mean that the Marshall Islands were 
being asked to provide a subsidy for the other groups in Micronesia, thereby relieving the 
administering authority, at least in part, of its own duty to provide a full measure of economic 
assistance to the people of those groups.  The first reason for making a constitution for the 
Marshall Islands was to give credibility to the push for a "No" vote in that district in a 
referendum on the adoption of the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 
that had already been drawn up.  In the event, 61.5% of Marshallese voted against the FSM 
Constitution, and only 38.5% supported it. 
The 1990 initiative to amend the Marshall Islands Constitution was also mainly about the 
sharing of power, this time the power to make dispositions of land.  All land in the Marshall 
Islands is held under customary law.  The Constitution contains a provision preventing any 
disposition of land by the iroij ­ the chiefs ­ unless approval has also been given on behalf of all 
persons having an interest in the land concerned. 13 Some chiefs proposed the amendment of 
this provision to prevent the holders of other classes of land rights from blocking a disposition 
desired by the chiefs.  The fight was joined in the elections of persons as delegates to the 
required Constitutional Convention. 14 Some candidates who favoured the amendment of the 
amended only with the approval of a two­thirds majority at a referendum.  On the second point, see 
the Niue Constitution Act 1974, ss 7 and 8. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article X, Section 1(2). 
14 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article XII, Sections 2(1) and 4.
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relevant article were not elected.  When the Convention met, no proposal for its amendment 
could attract the required majority.  The article, therefore, remains in its original form. 
In Fiji, the driving force was quite different, but still centred on the allocation of political 
power.  Fiji had become independent in 1970 under a constitution that allocated all seats in the 
House of Representatives on a communal basis, though with provision for some "cross­voting", 
which was supposed to give other communities a voice in the election of at least some 
community representatives.  There were an equal number of seats for Fijians and Indians, 
despite the fact that Indians had outnumbered Fijians since at least 1946.  The "general voters", 
that is those who were neither Fijian nor Indian, were over­represented in proportion to their 
number, and held the balance of power. 15 Fijians were encouraged to believe that, with the 
support of the general voters, they could govern indefinitely. 
Party splits and floating voters called that supposition into question in 1977.  A decade 
later, in 1987, the predominantly Fijian Alliance Government was defeated at a general election 
by a coalition of the multiracial Fiji Labour Party, under the leadership of Dr Timoci Bavadra, 
and the National Federation Party, then the main party of the Indian community.  When 
Parliament met, Dr Bavadra's Government was overthrown in a military coups, led by Colonel 
Sitiveni Rabuka.  In a later, second coups, staged when it looked as though it might be possible 
to form an interim all­party government under the existing Constitution, thus exposing Rabuka 
to a charge of treason, he abrogated that instrument, declared Fiji a Republic, and ruled by 
military decree.  Subsequently, an interim civilian administration was installed. 
Later still, in 1990, a new Constitution was promulgated, restoring parliamentary 
government but with an allocation of seats weighted in favour of indigenous Fijians, a 
requirement that the Prime Minister had to be a Fijian, and other provisions securing 
preferences for the Fijian community. 16 Remarkably, however, the 1990 Constitution did 
contain a provision requiring its "review" within seven years of its promulgation. 17 So far as I 
know, the reason for the inclusion of the provision has never been documented.  In any event, 
all parties were tacitly committed to honouring it. 
Although it was understood that the review could result in a decision to maintain the 1990 
Constitution in its existing form ­ an outcome many were to argue for ­ there appeared also to 
be an understanding that, if the review led to any amendment of the 1990 Constitution, the 
amendment itself needed be put in place within the seven­year period.    In fact, on the basis of 
the FCRC's report, a new and radically different "multiracial" Constitution was passed 
15 The Fiji Independence Order 1970, Schedule: The Constitution of Fiji, s 32. 
16 Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990, made on 25 July 
1990. 
17 Fiji Constitution, 1990, above, Schedule, s 161.
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unanimously in both Houses of the Fiji Parliament and received the President's assent on 25 
July 1977, seven years to the day after the promulgation of the 1990 Constitution. 18 But, as 
subsequent events graphically showed, there was, in reality, a lack of wide support among the 
people of the Republic of the Fiji Islands as a whole for the reallocation of political power that 
the 1997 Constitution brought about. 
Contrary to one suggestion, the reformulation of the Letters Patent Constituting the Office 
of Governor­General of New Zealand did not bring about any substantive change in the extent 
to which the Queen in right of New Zealand acts on the advice of New Zealand Ministers in 
constituting the office of Governor­General, and making appointments to it. 19 It did, however, 
clarify the powers of the holder of the office where they had been in doubt.  Among other 
things, the new Letters Patent established the following points: 
· The whole executive authority of New Zealand, including the foreign affairs power, 
vested in the Queen in right of New Zealand, is delegated to the Governor­General, 
and through the Governor­General to New Zealand Ministers and officials. 20 
· The self­governing State of the Cook Islands and the self­governing State of Niue 
remain part of the Realm of New Zealand, but the extent of the Governor­General's 
powers in those States ­ meaning the executive authority of the Government of New 
Zealand as well as the "things that belong to the office of Governor­General" ­ is 
governed exclusively by the Constitutions and other laws of those self­governing 
States. 21 
· The Ross Dependency is part of the Realm of New Zealand. 22 Accordingly, the 
Governor­General holds office there in that capacity, as well as being, by virtue of 
holding office as Governor­General of New Zealand, the Governor of the Ross 
Dependency. 23 In this context, I made good use of the 1957 New Zealand Law Journal 
article, "New Zealand's Claims in the Antarctic" by the Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson. 24 
18 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji).  For further information about this Act, see footnote 8 above. 
19 Gavin A Wood "New Zealand's Patriated Governor­General" (1986) 38 Political Science 113, 119­120. 
20 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor­General of New Zealand 1983, clause III. 
21 Letters Patent 1983, above, clauses I and IV(b).  See also cl VI(b). 
22 Letters Patent 1983, above, clause I. 
23 See the Order in Council, made on 30 July 1923, by virtue of the powers vested in His Majesty the King 
by the British Settlements Act 1887 (Imp) or otherwise: 1923 New Zealand Gazette, 2211. 
24 Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "New Zealand's Claims in the Antarctic" (1957) 33 NZLJ 38.
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The new Letters Patent leaves the question of the extent to which the Governor­General 
must act on the advice of his or her New Zealand Ministers, entirely to constitutional 
convention. 
The implication of these examples is that people seldom set out to make or amend a 
constitution unless they are ready to reconsider the distribution of power within their society. 
IV THE CONSTITUTION AS THE RULES OF THE POLITICAL GAME 
The report of the FCRC explained that, although the Opposition may disagree with the 
Government on important matters, both are agreed on the constitution as setting the rules of 
the political game. 25 For that reason, constitutions need to be generally acceptable to all 
citizens.  This proposition applies generally, but it was especially important in Fiji.  Making 
that point, the FCRC said: 26 
This does not mean that everyone must agree with every detail.  If a constitution is the product of a 
democratic process, some disagreement is inevitable.  But the process by which it is developed and 
adopted should be generally accepted, and disagreement about its terms should be kept within 
reasonable limits.  Those who would have preferred a different constitution must be able to accept 
the one actually adopted. 
Professor Cheryl Saunders, who also gave a paper at the conference, will recognise the 
unacknowledged borrowing from the very useful paper on Constitutional Preambles, which 
she wrote for the Commission's use. 27 
As the FCRC indicated, a constitution should be the product of a democratic process.  But if 
the constitution is to command general support, it is necessary to look beyond the normal rule 
that a majority, however narrow, may change the law of the land, however strongly its 
proposals are contested.  While, technically, that rule may sometimes apply in constitution­ 
making, there is always a need for all involved in that process to think about how they can 
meet substantial minority concerns, as well as those of the majority.  If that precept is ignored, 
especially by a majority that represents particular interests or a particular section of the 
community, there is little hope that the constitution will command the loyalty and respect of 
all. 
25 Fiji Constitution Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 
34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996). para 9.110. 
26 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, para 3.5. 
27 Cheryl Saunders "The Constitutional Preamble" in Brij V Lal and Tomasi R Vakatora (eds) Fiji and the 
World:  Research  Papers  of  the  Fiji  Constitution  Review  Commission (School of Social and Economic 
Development, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1997) 260.
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V HOW CAN A COUNTRY MAKE A CONSTITUTION? 
It follows that, if a new constitution or a constitutional amendment is to command general 
support, there is a need to think carefully about the best process for putting it in place.  As it 
happens, I have been involved in processes that were very different.  The one chosen in each 
case reflected, in large measure, the source of the power to make or amend a constitution on 
which the new instrument would rest.  That, too, differed widely.  It is noteworthy that the 
resulting constitutions are a good deal harder to amend than they were to adopt. 
In Niue, it was taken for granted that the Constitution for self­government would be put in 
place by the mechanism already used in the Cook Islands ­ that is an Act of the New Zealand 
Parliament that would be part of the law of both New Zealand and Niue, and would provide 
that the scheduled Constitution would be the Constitution of Niue.   It was accepted, however, 
that once the Constitution entered into force, the New Zealand Parliament would no longer be 
able to make laws for Niue, except at the Niue Assembly's request and with its consent. 28 The 
power to amend the Constitution would vest exclusively in the Niue Assembly, and would 
require the affirmative votes of not less than two­thirds of its members.  All amendments 
would need to be approved in a referendum.  Most amendments would require only a simple 
majority, but an amendment of an operative provision of the Niue Constitution Act and a few 
key provisions of the Constitution would require a two­thirds majority among those taking 
part. 29 
The content of the proposed Niue Constitution Bill and accompanying Constitution was 
discussed in detail with the Niue Island Assembly.  It was agreed that neither would come into 
force until the people of Niue, voting in a referendum observed by the United Nations, had 
decided that they wanted self­government on the basis of those documents.  As the 
administering authority, the New Zealand Government saw itself as having a responsibility 
and a right to contribute to the decision­making.  The people of Niue wished to remain New 
Zealand citizens, and were seeking a relationship of free association with New Zealand.  As a 
term of this relationship, New Zealand would have a continuing responsibility to provide 
necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue. 30 It was always clear, however, 
that the Government and people of Niue would have the last word.  When, on 3 September 
1974, in the presence of a United Nations observer team, the referendum was held, the vote 
was 65.4% in favour of Niue's new constitutional arrangements to 34.6% against. 
In contrast to what happened in Niue, constitution­making in the Marshall Islands saw the 
entire process initiated and completed without active participation by the United States, as the 
28 Constitution of Niue, Article 36(1). 
29 Constitution of Niue, Article 35. 
30 Niue Constitution Act 1974, ss 7 and 8.
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administering authority, though some funding was eventually provided.  So also were helpful 
comments.  In part, the non­involvement was the result of a philosophy stemming from the 
United States experience: people should be allowed to give themselves their own constitutions. 
In part, it was a result of the original anti­establishment character of the constitution­making 
initiative.  From the beginning, the assumption on all sides was that the Constitution would be 
autochthonous.  That is, it would not derive, directly or indirectly, from the law of a foreign 
country, but exclusively from the acts of the people and their representatives. 31 There was 
never the slightest suggestion that this method of making a constitution would not be legally 
effective in all forums where it might be put to the test. 32 
The first step was the convening of a widely representative constitutional convention. 
Provision for this purpose was made by Act of the Marshall Islands District legislature, the 
Nitijela.  The Convention consisted of forty­eight delegates, including members of the Marshall 
Islands delegation to the Congress of Micronesia, members of the Nitijela, the iroij (or chiefs), 
who are the traditional leaders, the "owners" of the atoll of Likiep, 33 and thirty­three delegates 
specially elected from twenty­four delegate districts, comprising the whole of the Marshall 
Islands. 
The Convention met in three sessions over a seventeen­month period.  At the first session, 
delegates debated the main issue, which was what was to be the form of government that the 
constitution should embody.  Strongly influenced by their neighbours in Nauru, with whom 
they had long had a close association, and observing the strife between the executive and 
legislative branches of government, which was then a feature of political life in the United 
States territory of Guam and the newly­established Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, the Marshallese political leaders wanted a deliberate choice to be made between a 
presidential and a parliamentary system of government.  Under the first, a directly­elected 
Head of State and of government would exercise executive authority and would have to work 
with a separately elected legislature.  Under the second, the Head of State and of Government 
would be a member of the legislature who commanded and retained the support of a majority 
31 This statement is a paraphrase of a decision taken in Samoa (formerly Western Samoa) by the Samoan 
Working Committee of the Constitutional Convention convened in that country in 1960: see James W 
Davidson "The Transition to Independence: The Example of Western Samoa" (1961) 3 Aus J Pol & Hist 
15, 34. 
32 Compare the discussion of autochthony in Western Samoa (now known simply as Samoa) in Sir 
Kenneth Roberts­Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1966) 298­301. 
33 "Owners", in relation to Likiep, describes the heads of two families descended from early European 
settlers who have come to have the status of traditional leaders.
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of its members.  In the event, the Convention accepted the recommendation of its steering 
committee that the parliamentary system should be adopted. 34 
At the second session, a more or less complete, though still rather rough draft constitution 
emerged.  The third session made further technical and policy changes, before a final vote.  The 
Convention adopted the final draft of the Constitution with the support of all but two of the 
forty­eight delegates.  The second step in the constitution­making process was the approval of 
the draft constitution by the majority of the people in a referendum. 35 That referendum was 
held on 1 March 1979, in the presence of a United Nations visiting mission.  The Constitution 
was adopted by a vote of 63.8% in favour to 36.2% against.  Only a simple majority was 
required. 
The successful functioning of the First Marshall Islands Constitutional Convention led that 
body to decide that all­important amendments to the new Constitution, once in place, would 
also need to be adopted by a Constitutional Convention.  Less important amendments can be 
made by the Nitijela with the support of two­thirds of its members.  A Convention to amend 
the Constitution may be convened only in accordance with the provisions of an Act of the 
Nitijela, is to be composed of members fairly representing all the people of the Marshall 
Islands, is to be specially elected by qualified voters, is to number at least ten more than the 
total membership of the Nitijela, and is to be organised and to proceed according to its own 
internal rules.  Whether amendments are proposed by a Constitutional Convention, or by the 
Nitijela, a referendum is required.  Amendments proposed by a Constitutional Convention 
need a two­thirds majority, rather than the simple majority required for amendments 
proposed by the Nitijela. 36 
In Fiji, the ways of making a constitution have been different again.  The original 
independence Constitution was made by the Queen on the advice of the Privy Council ­ an 
exercise of the prerogative constituent power. 37 I shall come back to that power later, in briefly 
discussing the making of the Letters Patent constituting the Office of the Governor­General of 
New Zealand. In the run­up to independence, the Fijian political leaders had approved the 
Constitution's most important provisions, those governing the allocation and filling of the seats 
in the House of Representatives.  The Indian political leaders had given provisional approval 
on the understanding that a Commission of Inquiry would look again at that question.  When 
the Commission reported, recommending that some seats be filled by voting on a common roll, 
34 This issue is further discussed below.  See Part VI. 
35 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article XIV, Section 6. 
36 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article XII. 
37 See The Fiji Independence Order 1970, Schedule: The Constitution of Fiji, s 32.
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under the single transferable vote system, the Fijian­dominated government took no action on 
the recommendation. 
The 1990 Constitution was made by decree of the Interim Government, 38 an autochthonous 
initiative reflecting the break in legal continuity resulting from the overthrow of the 1970 
Constitution, but one that became the basis of a new legal order.  Although the Indian 
community regarded the 1990 Constitution as having been imposed upon them without their 
consent, they agreed to take office under it.  There was general agreement that any amendment 
or replacement of the 1990 Constitution should be brought about through the processes it laid 
down for constitutional amendment.  These differed, depending on the nature of the 
amendment.  The most important amendments required the support of two­thirds of the 
members in both Houses, including those of not less than eighteen of the twenty­four members 
of the Senate appointed by the President on the advice of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, the Great 
Council of Chiefs.  No Bill amending the provisions for electing the members of the House of 
Representatives was to proceed until three months after the recommendations of a 
Commission of Inquiry on that matter had been tabled in Parliament. 39 The review of the 1990 
Constitution, required to be undertaken within seven years of its promulgation, implicitly 
involved the allocation of seats in the lower House.  A Commission of Inquiry was appointed 
by the President on 15 March 1995. 40 
The FCRC's terms of reference had been unanimously approved by both Houses of the Fiji 
Parliament. They laid down a number of criteria with which its recommendations were to 
comply. 41 At first sight, it looked as though the Commission was required to reconcile the 
38 Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990, made on 25 July 
1990. 
39 Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990, Schedule, 
Article 77. 
40 The FCRC's Terms of Appointment are reproduced in the Fiji Constitution Review CommissionThe Fiji 
Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996) 
Appendix B. 
41 The Fiji Constitution Review Commission summarised the task given to it by its terms of reference as 
follows: 
...  to review the Constitution and produce a report ...  recommending constitutional 
arrangements which will meet the present and future needs of the people of Fiji, and promote 
racial harmony, national unity and the economic and social advancement of all communities. 
These arrangements must take into account internationally recognised standards of individual 
and group rights; 
guarantee full protection and promotion of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous 
Fijian and Rotuman people; and 
have full regard for the rights, interests and concerns of all ethnic groups in Fiji.
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irreconcilable.  It was directed to work in private under the usual requirement as to non­ 
disclosure, except for evidence or information obtained at a public hearing.  Its report was 
tabled on 10 September 1996, at a special joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament, and was 
referred to a Joint Select Committee on the Constitution (JPSC).  In order to facilitate the 
Committee's work in an atmosphere free from the cut and thrust of everyday politics, the 
Government suspended all other Parliamentary business until the JPSC had had time to 
complete its report. 
The JPSC, too, met behind closed doors.  A record was kept of the decisions reached, but not 
of the discussions themselves. 42 The Committee accepted the general thrust of the FCRC's 
report, though with two major changes of emphasis that I later describe. 43 With a few 
exceptions, it arrived at its conclusions unanimously. 44 Its report was the basis of a Bill for 
what became the Constitution Amendment Act 1997.  In Parliament, as in the JPSC, the then 
Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, took the lead in promoting political agreement, with the 
support of the then Leader of the Opposition, Jai Ram Reddy.  The Leader of the Fijian Labour 
Party (FLP), Mahendra Chaudhry, who had signed the JPSC report with some reservations, 
argued for several changes.  Some leading Fijian parliamentarians were also critical, voicing 
their concern that Fijian interests were being short­changed.  At their request, Rabuka agreed 
to a free vote on the Constitution Amendment Bill, but announced that, if the Bill failed, he 
would go to the polls immediately with the proposed new constitutional arrangements as the 
central issue in the campaign.  This tactic was decisive.  As already mentioned, the Bill was 
passed unanimously in both Houses of the Fiji Parliament.  In accordance with its terms, what 
was in reality a new Constitution entered into force on 27 July 1998. 45 Despite all that has 
happened since, it remains the Constitution of the Republic of the Fiji Islands. 
See Fiji Constitution Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper 
No 34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996) para 1.6. 
42 This process had encouraged participants to engage in wide­ranging and uninhibited discussion of 
contentious issues, enabling them to express the fears and anxieties of the communities they 
represented.  Often the exchanges were heated and emotional as members defended entrenched 
positions or articulated new approaches. 
Brij V Lal Another Way: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Post­Coup Fiji (Asia Pacific Press, National 
Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1998) 87. 
43 These concerned the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives and the membership of the 
Cabinet.  See the discussion later in this paper at Part VIII. 
44  Report of the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on the Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
(Parliamentary Paper No 17 of 1997, Government Printer, Suva, 1997) paras 8.2 and 8.4. 
45 See above Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji).
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Just to complete the story about methods of constitution­making, the 1983 Letters Patent 
Constituting the Office of the Governor­General of New Zealand, 46 like the 1970 Fiji 
Constitution, were an exercise of the prerogative constituent power.  This is a remnant of the 
royal prerogative that has been part of the law of New Zealand ever since this country was 
brought within the Queen's dominions.  It allows the Queen to make provision for the 
country's government, but in New Zealand, a settled colony, legislative authority must be 
granted only to a legislature with a majority of elected members.  To the extent that Parliament, 
formerly that of the United Kingdom and now that of New Zealand, has made provision for 
the country's governance, the prerogative power is in abeyance. 
In 1983, the Office of Governor­General could have been constituted by an Act of the New 
Zealand Parliament, but there were legal and policy reasons for continuing to rely on the 
prerogative, as well as a desire to adhere to tradition.  In the United Kingdom, the Queen 
issues Letters Patent after they have been approved, in draft, by the Privy Council.  But, except 
for its Judicial Committee, the Privy Council is not a New Zealand organ of government.  The 
new Letters Patent were therefore approved in draft by an Order made by the Governor­ 
General in Executive Council, also acting under the prerogative constituent power. 47 Because 
it was desirable that the new instrument should replace the 1917 Letters Patent in the law of 
the Cook Islands and of Niue, as well as the law of New Zealand, those self­governing States 
also approved the new Letters Patent in draft and consented to their taking effect, as part of the 
law of all parts of the Realm of New Zealand. 48 
It will be obvious that the different ways of making or amending constitutions involve 
different tasks for the constitutional adviser.  They also involve different ways and levels of 
public participation.  I turn now to those issues. 
VI HOW DOES THE CHOSEN METHOD OF CONSTITUTION­MAKING AFFECT THE 
TASKS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER? 
In Niue, the Constitutional Adviser to the Niue Island Assembly, on the basis of his 
discussions with the Assembly and at other meetings with officials and the people, made 
proposals to the Assembly in the form of reports.  The Assemblymen ­ there were no women 
then ­ worked in the Niuean language, but their remarks were translated into English for the 
benefit of the Constitutional Adviser.  Similarly, his explanations and comments, and 
46 Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor­General of New Zealand 1983.  It took effect as at 28 
October 1983, SR 1983/225. 
47 Order in Council (26 September 1983). 
48 Letters Patent, above.
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eventually his oral reports, were translated into Niuean.  So also was his first written report. 49 
The writing of the second report, already presented orally, had to give way to work on the 
drafting of the Constitution.  It remained incomplete, but was supplemented by a long 
telegram from Geneva. 50 
Once the proposals in the Constitutional Adviser's reports had been accepted by both the 
Niue Island Assembly and the New Zealand Government as the basis for New Zealand 
legislation, the Constitutional Adviser took part in discussions with New Zealand officials 
about their implementation.   With a bit of help from his assistant, he scrutinised the drafts 
prepared by Parliamentary Counsel, provided comments, and suggested redrafts when 
necessary.   New Zealand officials sometimes had opposing views, and, at the end of the day, 
the Minister of Island Affairs had to take responsibility for the Niue Constitution Bill and the 
Constitution in the House of Representatives.  On occasions, the Constitutional Adviser 
engaged in advocacy on the Niue Island Assembly's behalf.  Although he was sometimes able 
to reconcile different views by proposing a compromise, he was in no doubt that, in the words 
of the Secretary of Maori and Island Affairs at the time of his appointment, he was the 
"Assembly's man".  Generally speaking, the end result reflected a meeting of minds. 
In the Marshall Islands, the Legal Counsel to a Constitutional Convention was seen as an 
adviser to delegates or to a Convention Committee who were putting forward their own 
proposals.   On the issue of the form of government that the Marshall Islands should adopt, 
delegates were convinced, rather alarmingly, that, if only they had a draft outline of a 
constitution embodying a particular form of government in front of them, and were able to 
read it, they would understand all its implications.  They did not want an explanation of the 
features of the different systems, by way either of theoretical exposition or of commentary.  The 
steering committee asked me to produce a draft constitution for a parliamentary system of 
government, and also one for a presidential system.  This I did.  The Legislative Counsel to the 
Nitijela, who had been Counsel to a large local government in the United States, produced a 
third draft combining legislative and executive functions in a single elected body modelled on 
a typical local government council.  After an absence from Majuro, I returned to find that the 
steering committee had decided to recommend to the Convention that it should draft a 
Constitution embodying the parliamentary model.  This was an act of faith based more on 
49 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of 
Niue (Community Development Office, Niue, 1971).  The Report was tabled in the New Zealand House 
of Representatives as [1971] AJHR A4, and was also published as UN Doc A/AC.109/378. 
50 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter  Second  Report  to  the  Niue  Island  Assembly  on  the  Constitutional 
Development  of  Niue, and accompanying message to the Leader of Government (4 March 1974), 
reproduced in (1999) 30 VUWLR 577.  See also, for a background note, Alison Quentin­Baxter "Human 
Rights and Decolonisation" (1999) 30 VUWLR 563.
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instinct than on reason, but I was asked to prepare a draft report setting out the supporting 
arguments for adoption by the committee and eventually the Convention as a whole. 51 
Apart from this one written report, all proposals made on the Convention floor, though 
drafted by Legal Counsel, were introduced orally by Committee chairpersons or individual 
delegates who had to explain them and argue for their adoption.  In this way the political 
leaders absorbed the detail and the nuances of the system of government they had decided to 
adopt.  Legal Counsel took no part in the debate, except to respond to questions put by the 
delegates when the Convention was meeting in select committee or in committee of the whole, 
which it did for most of the time.  As in Niue, all the discussion was in the local language.  An 
interpreter sat beside me to whisper a translation of each speaker's remarks or questions.  I 
made my replies in English, two sentences at a time.  These were then translated into 
Marshallese.  This gave me time to think of the next two sentences. 
The steering committee had also given me a pile of small pieces of paper on which 
delegates had handwritten their own suggestions about what should go into the Constitution. 
The committee had vetted these, and discarded the ones they did not wish to pursue.  I was 
asked to incorporate the rest in what gradually became a draft Constitution.  Later, Professor 
Tribe, in the role of consultant, presented memorandums to one or other of the Committees, 
sometimes jointly with me, about the implications of provisions already in the draft text, or 
others that a delegate wanted to include, but it was a feature of the original constitution­ 
making that very little was committed to writing except the evolving text of the Constitution 
itself.  All documents were presented in the Marshallese language, as well as in English. 
The 1990 Constitutional Convention was convened in accordance with a report of a Nitijela­ 
appointed committee that had recommended the calling of a Convention for the purpose of 
proposing amendments on the matters identified in its report.  The Committee had been set up 
under a constitutional provision requiring the Nitijela to make provision for such a report at 
least once in every ten years. 52 But in the Convention itself, it was up to the delegates to put 
forward proposed constitutional amendments.  Depending on their subject­matter, these were 
referred initially to one of the Convention Select Committees, whose Chairperson reported on 
the proposed amendment to the Convention as a whole. 
Legal Counsel's role was twofold.  First, I assisted delegates to put their proposed 
amendments into written form, in a manner that would fit in with the rest of the Constitution, 
identifying also any consequential amendments that would be required if the main 
51 Substantial excerpts from the report are reproduced in Report of the UN Visit to Observe the Referendum in 
the Marshall Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, 
46th Session, Supplement No 3) paras 163 ­ 167. 
52 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article XII, Section 6.
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amendment was adopted.  It was accepted that this task did not involve any judgment on my 
part about the merits of the amendment.  I would do my best to find a way of giving effect to 
the delegate's intentions but in a manner that did not involve the writing of legal nonsense.  On 
the most contentious matter, controls over the disposition of land by the chiefs, I helped draft 
six contradictory proposed amendments.  The matter was so controversial that I did not dare to 
suggest any sort of compromise, until requested to do so by the Convention Chairperson.  Even 
then, neither it nor any other proposal on the issue attracted the required majority from among 
the Convention delegates.  The provision therefore remains in its original form. 
Secondly, it was accepted that, if, as an independent adviser, I thought it desirable, I would 
provide a written memorandum on the implications of a proposed amendment to the 
Convention Committee considering it, and would attend Committee meetings, on my own 
initiative or at the Committee's request, to make oral comments or to respond to questions. 
Occasionally, the Convention sat in Committee of the Whole, so that Counsel could be further 
questioned by any delegate. 
In Fiji, the role of Counsel assisting a Commission of Inquiry was different again.  The 
Commission began its work at the beginning of June 1995.  It was clearly intended to act 
independently and in accordance with the highest professional standards.  To begin with, 
Legal Counsel spent a great deal of time in helping to organise the Commission's work.  I was 
grateful for my Law Commission project­planning experience.  It was agreed that the work 
should be undertaken in three phases. 
The first phase, which lasted until early in 1996, focussed on gathering and analysing 
information.  The FCRC made an early decision to hold public hearings in all parts of Fiji, so as 
to obtain an input from Fiji's citizens in a public and open process.  Thanks to the expertise of 
the Hansard reporters who accompanied us, we had prompt transcripts of the proceedings, as 
well as copies of the 852 written submissions received.  In due course, Legal Counsel provided 
an analysis of the issues that the submissions raised. 
The FCRC also identified the matters on which it would need further information and 
research.  It asked Fiji government departments and agencies to supply factual data and 
statistics.  It also asked a number of academics and other specialists, both in Fiji and overseas, 
to prepare research papers.  I drew heavily on my professional and personal contacts around 
the world, either to write papers themselves or identify others who might be willing to do so, 
in return for the very modest honorarium the Commission was able to offer.  Knowledgeable 
people, both in Fiji and overseas, responded generously to the Commission's requests for help. 
Five experts on voting systems in multi­ethnic societies were found and funded by the 
Electoral Division of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs.  All the papers written 
for the Commission have since been published by the School of Social and Economic
MAKING CONSTITUTIONS, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER 679 
Development of the University of the South Pacific. 53 The blurb on the back cover commends 
them as an invaluable resource of information and opinion about contemporary Fiji, and about 
particular problems posed by multi­ethnicity in any polity and for any constitution­framers. 
The FCRC also decided to make overseas visits for the following purposes: 
· First, it wished to obtain first­hand experience of how people in a selection of other 
multi­ethnic countries had tailored their constitutional arrangements to the nature of 
their societies.  It therefore visited Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa, each of which 
had something of special relevance to offer.  In each case, the FCRC commissioned 
papers from one or more local experts so that it had good background information and 
personal as well as official contacts once it got there.  These country visits provided 
insights that it would have been difficult to obtain in any other way. 54 
· Secondly, the Commission wished to find out more about the technicalities of various 
voting systems, and also the way in which they might operate in a multi­ethnic society. 
To this end, it visited both the Australian and the New Zealand Electoral Commissions 
and also met with officers from the Electoral Commissions in Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory.  It also had discussions with the two acknowledged world 
experts in this area, Professor Arend Lijphart, of the University of California at San 
Diego, and Professor Donald Horowitz, of Duke University. 
· Thirdly, in the course of its travels, the Commission took the opportunity to meet with 
as many as possible of the experts who were writing papers for it, so that there would 
be an opportunity for a personal presentation and face­to­face discussions. 
On its return to Suva, the FCRC met in private with high officers of State in Fiji and also 
requested written information from public and private sector bodies in Fiji and overseas. 
The second phase of the Commission's work began early in 1996.  The focus was on the 
development of policies that would guide its recommendations.  Much of its time was taken up 
in scrutinising the 1990 Constitution, as required by its terms of reference. 55 These also 
53 Brij V Lal and Tomasi R Vakatora (eds) Fiji in Transition and Fiji and the World: Research Papers of theFiji 
Constitution Review Commission (School of Social and Economic Development, The University of the 
South Pacific, Suva, 1997). 
54 See Alison Quentin­Baxter "Ethnic Accommodation in Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa" in Brij V 
Lal and Tomasi R Vakatora (eds) Fiji and  the World: Research Papers of  the Fiji Constitution Review 
Commission (School of Social and Economic Development, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, 
1997) 137. 
55 See the FCRC's Terms of Appointment are reproduced in the Fiji Constitution Review CommissionThe 
Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 
1996) Appendix B.
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required the Commission, among other things, to take into account internationally recognised 
principles and standards of individual and group rights.  Legal Counsel wrote Issues Papers, 
comparing the provisions of the 1990 Constitution with those of the 1974 Constitution and with 
the relevant international instruments or other sources that had influenced their wording, and 
posing questions for the Commission's consideration.  The outcomes of the Commission's 
deliberations were recorded in its minutes in the form of provisional decisions that would 
guide the writing of the report.  The FCRC met only for three hours each morning so that, with 
a struggle, Legal Counsel could just keep up the supply of Issues Papers in time for 
Commissioners to read them before deliberating.  Counsel took personal responsibility for the 
papers each prepared, but tried to give the other an opportunity of commenting before the 
paper was put into final form, a most useful form of collaboration. 
The third phase was the writing of the Commission's report.  The FCRC had decided that 
this phase would have to begin by 1 May 1996, if it was to meet its deadline for reporting, 
originally 30 June, but subsequently extended to 30 September.  In seeking the extension, the 
Commission undertook to make every effort to complete its work even before the due date.  On 
that basis, a joint meeting of both Houses of Parliament was arranged for 10 September, at 
which the report would be tabled.  It would be presented to the President on 6 September.  We 
simply had to meet that deadline. 
Between them, Legal Counsel were required to prepare a first draft of the Commission's 
report.  A larger share fell to me because Jon was still taking the Commission though the 
remaining issues.  Phases 2 and 3 thus overlapped.  As soon as a chapter of the draft report had 
been completed, the author distributed it to the Commissioners, each of whom made written or 
oral comments.  The author then took these in, reconciling them if necessary, and circulated the 
revised draft.  It was something of a miracle that, with one or two exceptions, the revised drafts 
were approved by all the Commissioners.  Any further changes that were required were fairly 
easily made.  An editor was engaged to co­ordinate the production of the final text. 
The 694 recommendations in the Commission's report were, in effect, drafting instructions 
for the preparation of a new constitution, though, naturally, not all recommendations broke 
new ground.  Many recommended the re­enactment of existing provisions, sometimes with 
alterations having varying degrees of significance.  But some recommendations called for a 
substantial departure from the existing political culture. 56 The FCRC emphasised that it had 
taken into account its terms of reference and all available sources of information.  It also 
stressed that its report, long as it was, should be considered as a whole.  Every part of the 
constitution was essential in constructing a framework for the operation of Parliament and the 
Government. 
56 The need for a change in the existing political culture is further discussed below at Part VIII.
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Once the report was presented, the task of Commissioners and Commission officers was 
over.  A Commission of Inquiry has no formal role in the discussion of its recommendations, 
and, in the case of the FCRC, did not have one in practice either.  Those of us from outside Fiji 
were clearly expected to return home as soon as convenient.  The completion of the work of 
revising the 1990 Constitution had to be left to others, a process that had a profound effect, so 
far as it concerns Fiji, on the issue I discuss next. 
VII SHOULD THE PUBLIC BE INVOLVED IN CONSTITUTION­MAKING, AND IF SO, 
HOW? 
Experience, as well as instinct, make it clear that the answer to the first part of this question 
must be 'Yes'.  A constitution cannot take root in the hearts and minds of the people who live 
under it unless they are kept fully informed about the process of making it, and take part in 
that process as much as possible.  How this is to be achieved depends in part on the method of 
constitution­making.  The open processes of decision­making and the subsequent referendums 
in Niue and the Marshall Islands readily allowed public participation.  In Fiji, the bulk of the 
decision­making took place in forums that were not open to the public ­ the deliberations of a 
Commission of Inquiry, and intense debate among politicians in closed sessions of a Joint 
Parliamentary Select Committee.  While serious efforts were made to obtain high quality public 
input beforehand, not nearly enough was done afterwards to educate the public about the 
reasons for making the kind of constitution that eventuated.  It was enacted by Parliament with 
little public debate and was not put to the people in a referendum. 
In my view, the political leaders of each community in Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram 
Reddy, were genuinely committed to the concept of multi­ethnic government on which the 
1997 Constitution is based.  The parties that each headed went into the subsequent general 
election in coalition, but the former supporters of those parties deserted them in droves.  The 
National Federation Party, led by Jai Ram Reddy, won no seats.  As this, and subsequent 
events showed, many, not only in the Fijian community but also in the Indian community, had 
little or no commitment to the constitution that had been made in their name.  It would be 
wrong to attribute the difficulties in getting the 1997 Constitution accepted and making it work 
entirely, or even mainly, to inadequacies in the constitution­making process.  But, in Fiji's 
multi­ethnic society, there was every reason to do even more to involve the public as fully as 
possible than was done as a matter of course in the homogeneous societies of Niue and the 
Marshall Islands. 
Although the Constitution of Niue was enacted by the New Zealand Parliament, it was 
based on a system of government that had been tried out in practice beforehand by Niue's 
people.  To the extent that there were new elements, such as the change in the relationship with 
New Zealand, from dependent territory to freely associated, self­governing State, the Niue 
Island Assembly, an elected representative legislature, was made fully aware of the issues and 
their implications, and approved the basis on which the new Constitution would be made.  In
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the Marshall Islands an even more widely representative and largely elected body itself made 
the decisions about what should go into the Constitution. 
The Constitution of each country was enacted or adopted in the local language as well as in 
English. 57 Similarly, the discussions in the Niue Island Assembly and the Marshall Islands 
Constitutional Convention were in, or were translated into, the Niuean and Marshallese 
languages respectively.  Every word that was uttered was broadcast to the people by radio. 
People listened closely to what was being said. 
At the two key stages of constitutional development in Niue, the Constitutional Adviser 
held meetings in every village, as well as with other groups such as the local branch of the 
Public Service Association.  His first report 58 was translated into Niuean, and a copy in both 
languages was distributed to every household.  Later, the visit of a Mission from the United 
Nations Decolonisation Committee provided both stimulus and reassurance that the United 
Nations was not trying to force Niueans to take decisions against their will.  One controversial 
issue was the extent to which Niueans who had left Niue should be involved in the 
constitution­making process.  Those who remained argued that those who had left Niue had 
voted with their feet.  It was agreed that only those still living on the island should vote in the 
referendum.  But the Niuean community in New Zealand had the opportunity to make 
submissions on the Niue Constitution Bill and accompanying Constitution at the select 
committee stage of its passage through Parliament.  The select committee also visited Niue. 
At both the Constitutional Conventions in the Marshall Islands at which I was Legal 
Counsel, specially appointed committees of delegates held extensive public hearings in the two 
main centres of population, Majuro and Kwajalein, and in other atolls or islands, as well as 
offshore, in places like Honolulu, Los Angeles and Guam, where there were sizeable 
Marshallese communities.  I attended the public hearings in Majuro and Kwajalein, 
occasionally cross­examined a witness if I felt there was a point that needed to be brought out, 
but otherwise listened and learned. 
As well as attending public hearings, I took part in other meetings with members of the 
public and interest groups, sometimes with Convention delegates, sometimes on my own.  The 
Women's Group in Majuro was particularly active.  After the First Convention had completed 
its work and before the referendum, it chartered a ship and took the draft Constitution to the 
outer islands to explain it to their people.  To see that kind of initiative was rewarding. 
57 For the version of the Niue Constitution enacted in the Niuean language, see Niue Constitution Act 
1974, First Schedule. 
58 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of 
Niue (Community Development Office, Niue, 1971).  The Report was tabled in the New Zealand House 
of Representatives as [1971] AJHR A4, and was also published as UN Doc A/AC.109/378.
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In comparison, the interest in constitution­making in Fiji was probably even more intense, 
but the level of understanding and the sense of active and responsible participation among the 
people as a whole was considerably less.  This probably reflected the following factors: 
· The larger size of the country, its social separation into different ethnic communities, 
and the fact that the first loyalty of many in the Fijian community is to those who share 
in the ownership of the land, to the traditional Fijian province in which the land lies, 
and to the leadership of the chiefs; 
· The fact that all Fiji's constitutions had been, and continued to be, written in English, 
without being translated into the country's other languages; 
· The fact that the constitution­making processes had been a one­way street, in which 
there had been opportunities for members of the public and groups to make an input, 
but virtually no opportunity for feedback, about what decisions were being made and 
why. 
That was a weakness of the process that the FCRC had to follow, although the public 
hearings that gave its members a first­hand sense of the hopes and fears of members of all 
communities were the greatest single influence on its subsequent recommendations.  In 
response to its duty to facilitate the widest possible debate throughout Fiji on the terms of the 
Constitution, the submissions were treated as public documents unless confidentiality had 
been requested.  Many were published by the news media.  Unfortunately, the Commission 
could not go back to the people and explain the reasons for its recommendations, what they 
meant, and why it had not followed other paths. 
The English language media published the FCRC's report in instalments, eventually in full. 
There was, however, a lack of knowledgeable independent comment.  The Government's 
decision to distribute the report, in English only, to the Fijian Provincial Councils and invite 
their comments was not a good way of promoting understanding or trying to get a balanced 
response, except in the one or two provinces where the chiefly leaders were both well­informed 
and well­intentioned.  In the absence of any outside help in working through the report, people 
turned straight to the recommendations about the distribution of seats in the House of 
Representatives and condemned them out of hand.  Non­governmental organisations like the 
Citizens' Constitutional Forum did, and continue to do, their best to widen understanding, but 
they do not have resources adequate to the task. Ironically, it is only in the wake of George 
Speight's attempt to overthrow the 1997 Constitution that there has been a serious large­scale 
effort to make it more accessible.  I understand that the Constitution has at last been translated 
into Fijian and Hindi, as required by its terms, 59 and that the Republic of Fiji Military Forces 
have made themselves responsible for taking copies to the Fijian villages and explaining what 
59 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji), s 4(2).
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it means.  A well­informed public debate about what kind of a country Fiji should aim to be, 
and whether the 1997 Constitution is a suitable means towards that end is yet to take place. 
That brings me to my next issue. 
VIII WHAT GOES INTO A CONSTITUTION? 
One purpose of a constitution is to establish the main organs of government and the 
division of powers among them.  It is generally assumed that another is to control the exercise 
of governmental power, especially as it affects the rights and interests of individual citizens, 
and, in a multi­ethnic society, those of different communities.  For that reason, the Constitution 
is expected to set standards against which governmental actions can be measured. 
Accordingly, a constitution usually has the status of supreme law.  To a large degree, those 
assumptions applied to making constitutions for Niue, the Marshall Islands, and Fiji. 
But a country's constitution is never written on a clean slate.  It is necessary to take account 
of its geography and history, its legal system, and existing form of government, and the culture 
of the people.  Is the country homogeneous or multi­ethnic?  Is it a chiefly society?  What are 
the units of social organisation?  Are customary rights important, particularly those to land? 
How are the rights of individuals to be reconciled with those of groups?  I should like to 
illustrate how, in each of the three countries in which I worked, ways were found to 
accommodate the most important of their special features. 
Here I have to admit to being conservative, in the sense that my first instinct is to maintain 
the greatest possible continuity between the old regime and the new, in the interests of a 
smooth transition.  I would also say, without the slightest cynicism, that the first principle of 
constitution­making in the Pacific is that those in paid jobs should continue to have paid jobs. 
The reason is that paid jobs are scarce.  A person who has one is a walking social security 
system for the whole of his or her extended family. 
But after the experience of working in Fiji, I came to appreciate also a perception of 
Professor Yash Ghai, one of the veteran constitutional advisers in the Pacific region.  He has 
taken the view that the moment of constitution­making, specially one involving a dependent 
territory's move to independence, may be the only time when the impetus for change is so 
strong that it is possible to bring about a radical redistribution of power that, at any other time, 
would be impossible, because of the vested interests involved.  So, for example, the 
Constitution of Vanuatu abolished, with the stroke of a pen, all non­customary titles to land, 
leaving it to later law­makers to deal with the question of compensation and other resulting 
issues.  I came to appreciate that there is sometimes a need for radical change when I began to 
understand the consequences, in Fiji, of cementing the existing system of communal 
representation into the independence constitution, instead of rooting it out, as the Indian 
community had then desired.  Of course, such a radical change would have needed the support 
of both communities.  Ironically, both main communities, rather than just the Fijian
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community, have now become wedded to maintaining the system of communal representation 
more or less intact. 
As its first, direction­setting recommendation, the FCRC stated that: 60 
The primary goal of Fiji's constitutional arrangements should be to encourage the emergence of 
multiethnic government. 
As a means to this end, it further recommended that: 61 
The people of Fiji should move gradually but decisively away from the communal system of 
representation.  They should adopt electoral arrangements which encourage parties to seek the 
support of other communities as well as their own. 
The FCRC saw each part of the Constitution as load­bearing.  All its parts were essential in 
helping to carry the weight of the structure, as a whole.  Accordingly, the Commission 
recommended that approximately two­thirds of the seats should be open to candidates from 
any community, elected by the voters of all communities, but, as a transitional measure, 
approximately one third of the seats should be reserved for particular communities. 62 Neither 
the Government, nor the Opposition members of Parliament, were ready to contemplate such a 
large departure from the existing political culture.  The 1997 Constitution reverses the FCRC's 
recommended proportions of communal and open seats, 63 but seeks to compensate for this 
timidity by introducing, against the FCRC's recommendation, the controversial provision that 
all parties with ten per cent or more of the seats in the House of Representatives are entitled to 
be represented in the Cabinet. 64 This retention, and even accentuation, of conflicting electoral 
incentives threatens the stability of the whole Constitution. 
In the homogeneous societies of Niue and the Marshall Islands, it was easier to find 
solutions to problems of equitable representation in the legislature.  In Niue, it was a given that 
each of the fourteen villages should continue to elect its own member, though some of the 
villages were little more than rotten boroughs.  The Constitution, therefore, provided for an 
additional six 'common­roll' seats to be filled on an island­wide basis. 65 As a consequence, 
women have been elected to the Assembly for the first time, and members have more of a 
60 Fiji Constitution Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 
34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996) Recommendation 1. 
61 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendation 4. 
62 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendations 252 and 253. 
63 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji), s 51. 
64 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji), s 99. 
65 Constitution of Niue, Article 16(2)(b)(ii).
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national outlook.  Niue can convincingly argue that, taking account of the permitted margin of 
appreciation, it meets the commitment to equal suffrage by which it is bound under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 66 
Similarly, in the Marshall Islands, it was accepted that each of the main inhabited atolls or 
islands should have at least one member in the Nitijela.  The delegates huddled in the 
traditional smoke­filled room and emerged with agreement on the way in which the thirty­ 
three seats should be spread among twenty­four electoral districts.  But some of the districts are 
very small in both size and population.  The Constitution requires the Nitijela to consider the 
question of a reapportionment at least once in every ten years.  Any reapportionment is to be 
directed to the reasonable equality of the suffrage, and can be effected by the Nitijela itself, 
without the need to amend the Constitution. 67 Even so, the possibilities for reapportionment 
are limited.  The main factor mitigating the inequality of the suffrage is that a person may vote 
in either the electoral district in which he or she resides, or any other district in which he or she 
has land rights. 68 As many Marshallese have land rights in a number of different atolls or 
islands, the supposition is that some will choose to vote in an electoral district where their 
votes will count most, thus bringing about a de facto reapportionment.  There is provision for 
the legislative control of re­registration to prevent gerrymandering when an election is 
imminent. 69 
Another feature of the Marshall Islands Constitution is that the people of every populated 
atoll, or island that is not part of an atoll, have the right to a system of local government.  Such 
a local government may make laws, impose taxes, and appropriate revenue, except so far as is 
inconsistent with an Act of the Nitijela or any other instrument having the force of law in the 
Marshall Islands. 70 The right to a local government was seen as a matter of survival for 
vulnerable isolated communities. The people do not have to wait for the Nitijela to give them 
one.  If necessary, they may give themselves a local government.  Sitting on an atoll myself, 
and wondering if such a provision was workable, I remembered the argument of a leading 
authority that the act of the original Wellington settlers in giving themselves a rudimentary 
form of government, before British sovereignty was proclaimed, was compatible with "the 
strain of common sense and natural justice running through the common law". 71 
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25. 
67 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article IV, s 2. 
68 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article IV, s 3. 
69 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article IV, s 3. 
70 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article IX, ss 1 and 2. 
71 Sir Kenneth Roberts­Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1966) 154.
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Another question that had to be considered in the circumstances of each country was 
whether a Bill of Rights should be included in the Constitution, and if so, in what form. 
Although Samoa had become independent of New Zealand under a Constitution that 
contained a Bill of Rights, that precedent was not originally followed in the Cook Islands, 72 
and has never been followed in Niue.  There, the Constitution as enacted sought to fill the gap 
at least partially by including a novel provision requiring the Chief Justice to be given the 
opportunity to report on the legal, constitutional, and policy issues raised by a Bill that made 
provision concerning the constitution or jurisdiction of any court of general jurisdiction, 
specified aspects of the criminal law and procedure, and the law as to personal status. 73 The 
purpose of the provision was to ensure that provisions of the ordinary law of Niue protecting 
fundamental human rights and freedoms were not inadvertently amended or repealed.  The 
provision was, thus, a forerunner of section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  It 
was repealed in 1992 on the ground that it was no longer necessary, presumably because, by 
this time, legal advice was more readily available to the Niue Government and Assembly. 74 
Because the Marshall Islands were administered by the United States, its people were 
familiar with the United States Bill of Rights, and took it for granted that their own constitution 
would include one.  But when I showed them the Samoan Bill of Rights as a possible model, 
they rejected it out of hand as appearing to qualify the stated rights out of existence.  Professor 
Laurence Tribe produced a much more palatable text that is, in effect, a codification of the 
United States Bill of Rights in the light of decisions of the Supreme Court, but with his own 
liberal improvements incorporated. 75 It makes interesting reading. 
In Fiji, the people were so little aware of what was in their Constitution that the FCRC 
received a number of submissions asking for a Bill of Rights to be included.  In fact, the 1970 
Constitution had contained a long chapter on fundamental rights and freedoms, modelled on 
72 In the Cook Islands, the Constitution was amended in 1981 to include a Bill of Rights. 
73 Constitution of Niue, Article 31.  Although, on its face, the provision cut across the division of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government on the one hand, and the judicial 
branch on the other, it was carefully drafted so as to give the Chief Justice the option of deciding that it 
was not appropriate to make comments on issues that would compromise the independence of the 
judiciary or disqualify the Chief Justice from taking part in a subsequent case involving the legislation 
subsequently enacted.  The provision was included with the agreement of the then Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Niue. 
74 See the Constitution Amendment (No 1) Act 1992 (Niue), ss 3 and 4.  The Constitution Review 
Committee which recommended the repeal did so with the concurrence of the Chief Justice.  SeeReport 
to the Niue Assembly of the Constitution Review Committee; presented to the Niue Assembly by leave,September 
1991 (Government Printer, Alofi, 1991) 19. 
75 Ten years later, some thought it was too liberal, but an attempt to lower somewhat the level of 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures did not secure the necessary majority in the 
ensuing referendum.
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the European Convention on Human Rights, by which Fiji had become bound when still a 
British colony.  The drafter, however, had included every possible qualification of each right, 
mostly to make it clear, ex abudante cautela, that all sorts of unexceptionable legislative 
initiatives were not to be taken as limiting the right, but every now and again to permit 
limitations that, by modern standards, were unacceptable.  One example was the permitted 
limitation of the freedom of movement of an individual person, if reasonably required in the 
interests of defence, public safety, or public order, the device often used to restrict the freedom 
of movement of an anti­government political leader. 76 The 1974 provisions were reproduced 
in the 1990 Constitution, though with some amendments permitting positive discrimination in 
favour of the Fijian community in particular, and to a lesser extent other communities.  The 
FCRC went through the existing provisions carefully, recommended changes that seemed 
desirable, and sought to dispel the sometimes­voiced notion that the recognition of individual 
rights in the Constitution was necessarily at the expense of the rights of communities, 
particularly their group rights arising from the customary law. 
The relationship between individual and group rights had earlier been in issue in the 
Marshall Islands.  There, it was important that the hierarchical structure of traditional rights in 
land should be protected against the possibility of being dismantled by the courts through the 
application of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws and freedom from discrimination. 77 
The Constitution therefore provided that nothing in the Bill of Rights was to be construed so as 
to invalidate the customary law or any traditional practice concerning   land tenure or any 
related matter. 78 A ratchet provision prevents any codification or development of the 
customary law by the Nitijela in a manner involving any greater derogation from the Bill of 
Rights than that arising from the customary law in its unwritten form. 79 
The same approach had been taken in Fiji under both the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions.  It is 
not generally understood, in Fiji or elsewhere, that the Constitution of that country has always 
protected certain Acts of the colonial legislature recognising the land and other rights of the 
Fijian community.  They cannot be challenged on the ground of inconsistency with the Bill of 
Rights.  Nor can they be amended or repealed by ordinary legislation.  In effect, the relevant 
Acts are made part of the Constitution.  They recognise the following rights and obligations: 
76 The Commission considered that such a limitation was not justified, except possibly as a derogation 
from fundamental freedoms in a time of emergency threatening the life of the nation: Fiji Constitution 
Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 34 of 1996, 
Government Printer, Suva, 1996) paras 7.261 ­ 7.262, and Recommendation 163. 
77 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article II, s 12. 
78 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article X, s 1. 
79 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article X, s 2.
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· The rights of Fijians to their land under the customary law; 80 
· Fijian chiefly titles; 81 
· Restrictions on the alienation of Fijian land by the land­owning groups; 82 
· The right of the Native Land Trust Board to enter into leases in respect of Fijian land; 83 
· Rights to Rotuman land and chiefly titles; 84 
· The holding of Banaban land in accordance with Banaban custom; 85 
· The rights of landlords and tenants of all agricultural land (most of which is Fijian 
land); 86 
· The right to a separate system of governance for and by Fijians; and 87 
· The right to separate systems of governance for and by the Rotuman and Banaban 
communities. 88 
The FCRC found that the recognition of land and fishing rights in accordance with custom 
did not discriminate against the members of other communities that did not have customary 
rights, and, if they held land or rights in land, did so under another system of tenure.  The only 
respect in which the legislation was discriminatory was in restricting the alienation of Fijian 
land and permitting land not required by the Fijian owners for their maintenance or support to 
be leased out by the Native Lands Trust Board, without any requirement that the ownership 
group give its consent, or even that it be consulted. 89 The FCRC recommended that, in the 
national interest in the efficient use of land, the right to equality under the law and not to be 
discriminated against on the ground of race or ethnic origin should, to this extent, be limited. 90 
80 The Native Lands Act (Cap 133) (Fiji). 
81 The Native Lands Act (Cap 133) (Fiji). 
82 The Native Land Trust Act (Cap 134) (Fiji). 
83 The Native Land Trust Act (Cap 134) (Fiji). 
84 The Rotuma Lands Act (Cap 138) (Fiji). 
85 The Banaban Lands Act (Cap 124) (Fiji). 
86 The Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (Cap 270) (Fiji). 
87 The Fijian Affairs Act (Cap 120) (Fiji) and the Fiji Development Fund Act (Cap 21) (Fiji). 
88 The Rotuma Act (Cap 122) (Fiji) and the Banaban Settlement Act (Cap 123) (Fiji). 
89 Fiji Constitution Review Commission The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 
34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996) paras 17.6 ­ 17.8. 
90 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendation 630.
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That right should also be capable of being limited by laws for the governance of a particular 
community as long as those laws did not discriminate against any person on any other 
prohibited ground ­ gender for example ­ and did not deny to any person any other human 
right or fundamental freedom recognised by the Constitution or by law.  On this basis, all the 
relevant legislation should continue to receive constitutional protection. 91 
The FCRC recommended that the chiefly council known as the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (BLV) 
should continue to exist, and that its composition, as well as its powers and functions, should 
be provided for in the Constitution. 92 Instead of appointing the President, it should nominate 
candidates, leaving the President to be elected at a joint sitting of the two Houses, acting as an 
electoral college. 93 These recommendations were not acted upon.  The 1997 Constitution 
recognises the continued existence of the BLV under the Fijian Affairs Act, and provides that 
the BLV is to appoint persons to the office of President and the newly­created office of Vice­ 
President, after consultation with the Prime Minister. 94 
Niue is not now a chiefly society, but in the Marshall Islands it was essential to find a way 
of giving the highest­ranking chiefs ­ the iroijlaplap ­ a role under the Constitution.  The 
Constitution therefore provides for a Council of Iroij, modelled to some extent on the House of 
Arikis of the Cook Islands.  In addition to the function of advising the Cabinet on any matter of 
concern to the Marshall Islands, the Council of Iroij may request the reconsideration of any Bill 
affecting the customary law or any traditional practice, or land tenure or any related matter, 
which has been adopted on third reading by the Nitijela. 95 The 12 members of the Council of 
Iroij are selected, essentially by their peers, under provisions formulated by the delegates after 
discussions that, at both the First Constitutional Convention and again at the 1990 Convention, 
consumed more time than any other issue. 96 The Council of Iroij has the potential to exercise 
considerable influence, but my impression is that it has done so only indirectly.  Even so, the 
institution has been a satisfactory way of recognising the important role of the chiefs in 
Marshallese society. 
All these arrangements are seen as compatible with what is otherwise a democratic form of 
government.  That brings me to my next question. 
91 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendation 641. 
92 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendation 205. 
93 Fiji Constitution Review Commission, above, Recommendations 222 and 224. 
94 Constitution Amendment Act 1997 (Fiji), ss 90 and 116. 
95 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article III, s 2. 
96 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article III, s 1.
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IX IS THE WESTMINSTER CONSTITUTION A SATISFACTORY EXPORT MODEL? 
All the constitutions I have been concerned with have been of the Westminster type ­ that is 
the head of the government is chosen from among the members of the legislature on the basis 
that he or she commands majority support in that body.  This system has the advantage of 
having evolved pragmatically, as the House of Commons gradually established its supremacy 
over the King, in his executive as well as his legislative capacity.  At the time when the political 
leaders in the Marshall Islands chose such a system in preference to one requiring the separate 
direct election of the head of the government, it seemed that the Westminster system was 
working well in the island States of the Pacific region.  Since then, that system, or possibly any 
fully democratic system, has had something of a bad press in that part of the world. 
In Fiji, but not only there, the Westminster system is often stigmatised as resulting in a 
'winner takes all' outcome, but that statement may simply reflect the absence of a culture which 
positively sustains the idea of majority rule, especially by recognising that it is the 
responsibility of any government to govern for the benefit, not just of its political supporters, 
but of the whole community.  In Fiji, where the political parties have so far been ethnically 
based, it is easy to see why a general election has been seen, essentially, as a contest between 
the two main communities.  It is hard to think of ways of overcoming this situation unless Fiji's 
people as a whole come to accept that multi­ethnic government is in the interests of all.  Multi­ 
ethnic government implies multi­ethnic opposition as well.  But there and elsewhere, there is 
some suggestion that opposition to a government once in power is not acceptable. 
In societies that have not previously been divided by political issues, the Westminster 
system is said to encourage the development of parties, resulting in adversarial politics 
between those in Government and those who are not.  If disagreement about policies is not a 
reflection of other divisions in the society, I think that what grates is not the disagreement 
itself, but the idea of voicing it openly, especially if doing so involves a direct challenge to the 
views of the chiefs or elders who traditionally exercised authority.  In the confined physical 
space available to many Pacific communities, the maintenance of a peaceful society depends on 
the exercise of the greatest personal self­restraint.  In contrast, some aspects of the Westminster 
system seem to require direct confrontation.  Examples are the questioning of ministers by 
backbenchers, and even more, the moving of motions of no confidence.  I sometimes wonder 
whether the tendency to try to avoid a vote on such a motion by resorting to a boycott that 
deprives the legislature of a quorum is not just an attempt to head off the consequences of a 
shift in political support, but the reflection of a deep sense of unease about the explicit 
challenge involved.  Be that as it may, the Westminster system, and perhaps any other form of 
democracy, may also give a society the opportunity to move away from a tradition found to 
have serious disadvantages without the disruption that would otherwise be likely. So, for 
example, in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the most recent general election led to the 
choice of a university­educated commoner as President, in preference to a paramount chief,
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who had been elected to that office as a matter of course on the death of his predecessor, but 
was widely regarded as having shown himself unfit for the task. 
At this point, I should like to say a little about constitutional mechanisms for choosing the 
head of the government.  In the home of the Westminster system, and also in New Zealand, the 
Sovereign or her representative, the Governor­General has a formal role, though the real 
decision is made by the electors.  The leader of the winning party or pre­election coalition will 
be the Prime Minister.  If, after a general election, it is not clear which party or group of parties 
that is willing to work together commands the support of a majority in Parliament, the 
question may need to be left to Parliament to decide by means of a vote.  This system was 
written into the Constitution of the Cook Islands.  In the absence, at the time of self­ 
government, of a party system, the Constitution conferred discretions concerning the 
appointment and dismissal of a Prime Minister and the grant or refusal of a dissolution of 
Parliament, originally on the New Zealand High Commissioner, and later on the holder of the 
separate office of Queen's Representative.  The exercise of these discretions, however, must be 
reconciled with the need for the Prime Minister to have and retain the support of a majority of 
the members of the legislature, as evidenced by an actual expression of its will in a vote, or in 
some other unequivocal act.  The application of the provisions has not been without its 
difficulties, though wise guidance from constitutional advisers and the courts has led to a 
better understanding of their intended effect. 97 
The much smaller society of Niue attached so much importance to the continued presence 
there of a Representative of the Government of New Zealand that it asked for provision to this 
effect to be included in the Niue Constitution Act. 98 There was, however, no inclination to try 
to combine that role, with the role of the representative of the sovereign in Niue, as had 
originally been done in the Cook Islands. 99 Nor did it seem appropriate for the sovereign to be 
separately represented there.  The constitutional adviser to the Niue Island Assembly sought a 
simpler solution.  The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru provided a model.  There, a 
President elected by the legislature from among its own members serves both as Head of State 
and head of the executive government.  The Constitution is self­regulating, in that the 
formation or dismissal of a government and the dissolution of the legislature occur exclusively 
97 See Reference by the Queen's Representative [1985] LRC (Const) 56.  See also Dr Alex Frame Opinion of 2 
July  1999  for His Excellency Sir Apenera Short KBE, Queen's Representative  in  the Cook  Islands.  The 
Solicitor­General of the Cook Islands has agreed that this opinion be made public.  See, Dr Alex Frame 
"Lawyers and the Making of Constitutions: Making Constitutions in the South Pacific: Architects and 
Excavators" Roles and Perspectives in the Law, 275. 
98 Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 9. 
99 This provision was made at the request of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, although it had been 
advised that the dual role was unlikely to work well.
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through operation of the constitutional provisions as a matter of law, without the need for the 
exercise of discretions. 
That model was followed in Niue.  Governments are formed and may be dismissed, and 
the Assembly is dissolved, solely by operation of law, usually as a consequence of a vote in the 
Niue Assembly, though in some cases the relevant provisions may be set in motion by a 
minority of its members. 100 The Governor­General, who continues to be the representative of 
Her Majesty the Queen in Niue, is not involved. 101 In the few cases where residual discretions 
are required, they are vested in the Speaker of the Niue Assembly. 102 
When it came to making a constitution in the Marshall Islands, those of Nauru and Niue 
provided models for electing or securing the resignation of a President who would serve both 
as Head of State and as the head of the government only so long as he or she retained the 
support of a majority in the legislature.  There, however, the idea that the President's term of 
office, or the term of the Nitijela itself, might come to an end prematurely, as a result of a vote 
of no confidence, was new to the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.   They were 
inclined to insist that both should be allowed to run their full four­year terms.  In this context, 
the invited comments of the United States authorities were helpful.  They suggested that there 
was little point in the people of the Marshall Islands adopting the parliamentary system of 
government if they did not make use of its main advantage ­ that is the mechanism for 
resolving deadlocks between the executive and the legislative branches of government in the 
period between general elections.  With this encouragement, the Convention made provision 
for what are, in effect, constructive votes of no confidence.  Such a vote lapses if a new 
President is not elected within a fourteen­day time limit. 103 If a vote of no confidence is twice 
carried and twice lapses without any other President holding office in the interval between the 
two votes, the President may dissolve the Nitijela.  A general election must then be held. 104 
100 Constitution of Niue, Articles 4(2), 5(4), 6(3), 22(1), and 26. 
101 Although the Queen in right of New Zealand is the Head of State and the source of Niue's executive 
authority, the Constitution delegates the sovereign's executive authority directly to the Cabinet, not to 
the representative of the Head of State: Constitution of Niue, Article 2(2).  In these circumstances, it 
was possible to provide that the Governor­General of New Zealand would remain the Queen's 
representative in relation to Niue: Constitution of Niue, Article 1.  The Letters Patent constituting the 
Office of Governor­General of New Zealand are subject to the Niue Constitution Act 1974, and the 
Constitution and other law of Niue.  That proposition is inherent in the status of the Letters Patent as 
an exercise of the prerogative constituent power, but is also expressly recognised: Letters Patent 
Constituting the Office of Governor­General of New Zealand 1983, clauses III(b) and IV(b). 
102 Constitution of Niue, Articles 22(1) and 26. 
103 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article V, s 7. 
104 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article IV, s 13.
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In adapting the Westminster system for use in a republic, another issue was the proper 
location of the executive power.  Apart from the problem that the Head of State was also to be 
the head of the government, any notion that the executive power should be vested in the 
President, but that the President should be required to act on the advice of the Cabinet, was 
outside anything in the experience of the people of the Marshall Islands.  Building on the 
example of the Niue Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
therefore vests the executive authority of the Marshall Islands directly in the Cabinet, whose 
members are collectively responsible to the Nitijela.   Because the Constitution operates in a 
setting where United States concepts are more familiar than those originating in Westminster, 
the Constitution spells out the role of the Cabinet under the parliamentary system in the 
following terms: 105 
Subject to law, the Cabinet may exercise elements of its executive authority directly, or through its 
individual members, and through other officers responsible to the Cabinet; but neither the 
provisions of any such law, nor any delegation of elements of the Cabinet's executive authority 
shall have the effect of diminishing the responsibility of the Cabinet and of each of its members to 
the Nitijela for the direction and implementation of executive policies. 
If it is ever decided that the executive authority of New Zealand should be vested in the 
Cabinet, instead of the Queen, as at present, or the holder of a new office of President, that 
statement may be worth revisiting. 
On the basis of this limited experience, my conclusion is that, in a divided society, no 
democratic system of government can bring about national unity unless majority rule is 
tempered by measures that protect the special interests of communities and other groups. 
Subject to the need for that safeguard, it may be easier to achieve harmony between the 
executive and legislative branches of government under the Westminster system than under a 
system providing for the separate election of the head of the executive branch. 
X WHAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISER? 
By now, it will be apparent that a constitutional adviser tries to bring technical expertise 
and experience to the task of fashioning a constitution suited to the circumstances of the 
country for which it is designed, and capable of meeting its people's aspirations and concerns. 
I accept the criticism sometimes voiced that a constitutional adviser's proposals are likely to be 
circumscribed by his or her own background, knowledge, and personal philosophy.  That is 
inevitable.  Constitutional advisers have to work from what they already know, though, so far 
as possible they should always be open to the idea that there may be a range of responses to 
the questions that arise, or other questions that ought to be asked.  More than most 
constitution­making exercises, the FCRC drew on comparative constitutional material, in other 
105 Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Article V, s 1(2).
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Pacific countries and in other multi­ethnic countries, as well as international human rights 
instruments.  But it will seldom, if ever, be practicable for a constitutional adviser to survey all 
the constitutions of the world in order to come up with an idea that would have been useful if 
only he or she had known about it. 
In this concluding section of the paper, I wish, rather, to discuss the ethical responsibility of 
the constitutional adviser.  Although, as I have suggested, the adviser may sometimes have a 
role as advocate for a particular point of view or as conciliator among competing views, it is 
necessary to be mindful always of where his or her responsibility lies.  Responding to the news 
that a ministerial directive had been obtained on a point about the draft Constitution of Niue 
raised with officials by the Niue Executive Committee (the forerunner of the Cabinet), without 
consulting the Constitutional Adviser to the Niue Island Assembly, and in the belief that he 
might not be happy with the decision made, the Adviser had this to say: 106 
I am happy enough about the decision, but not about the lack of consultation, or the misconception 
as to what my position would be if I had been invited to express it. ...  I am not concerned to reach 
any conclusions which the Niuean leaders themselves do not freely accept.  One of the implications 
of self­government is that, in matters that are within their own disposition, you must let people do 
as they like.  My first responsibility is to ensure that every decision does reflect their will, arrived at 
without any outside constraint, and after they have understood the choices and implications. 
A message the following day contained a more general statement of the Constitutional 
Adviser's responsibilities as the work on the draft Bill for a Niue Constitution Act and the 
Constitution continued: 107 
I would of course like to be able: 
(1) to satisfy myself that any change is made with a full grasp of all the issues and 
implications; and 
(2) to continue to give the Niueans independent advice as to the advantages or 
disadvantages of any proposed change from their point of view. 
After that, the exchanges of views continued until the Constitutional Adviser recorded his 
satisfaction that the draft Constitution was a workable document. 108 
Arriving in Majuro to take up the position of Counsel to the First Marshall Islands 
Constitutional Convention, I had a different problem.  I discovered that the delegates who 
were opposed to the initiative to draft a separate Constitution for the Marshall Islands, instead 
106 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter, Telegram (20 June 1974) from Geneva to Wellington. 
107 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter, Telegram (21 June 1974) from Geneva to Wellington. 
108 Robert Quentin Quentin­Baxter, Telegram (25 July 1974) from Geneva to Wellington.
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of leaving them to become part of the Federated States of Micronesia, were boycotting the 
Convention.  I asked to be taken to meet them.  In the back of a small cafe in the town centre, I 
explained that, although I had been invited to act as Counsel by the Marshall Islands 
Leadership Group, whose policies they opposed, my responsibility was to all delegates to the 
Convention.  If at any stage they did want to take part, or simply to understand what was 
happening, I was at their service as well as that of the other delegates.  My initiative did not 
have much effect on their subsequent attitude or actions but, at the personal level, it was 
appreciated. 
From then on, it was a matter of learning on the job.  I would just say that a constitutional 
adviser in another country never knows when something will happen that puts the 
independence of that role to the test.  You have to be mentally ready, if necessary, to get on ­ or 
be told to get on ­ the next plane, and not come back.  Fortunately, things never got to that 
point in the Marshall Islands, or later in Fiji, although it sometimes looked as if they might.  I 
am proud of two comments that were made to me as we neared the end of the task in the 
Marshall Islands.  One person told me that I was the only foreigner who had ever come there, 
and, instead of telling the Marshallese people what they had to do, told them what they could 
do, and let them choose.  Someone else said that I had never wavered in my belief that the 
people of the Marshall Islands would succeed in giving themselves their own Constitution.  To 
appreciate the significance of that belief in their eyes, you have to realise that they had been 
part of the sphere of influence of the Spanish (who colonised the Philippines and parts of the 
Northern Marianas), and had then been governed successively by the Germans, the Japanese, 
and the Americans. 
In Fiji, I needed more than ever to believe in the achievability of the task of recommending 
a new Constitution that would fulfil the aspirations of the people of Fiji, as enunciated in one of 
their rare moments of agreement. 109 It remains to be seen whether they will be able to make 
progress towards the goals of racial harmony, national unity, and the economic and social 
advancement of all communities through the 1997 Constitution, either in its present form, or as 
amended through the processes it prescribes. 
109 The FCRC's Terms of Appointment are reproduced in the Fiji Constitution Review CommissionThe Fiji 
Islands: Towards a United Future (Parliamentary Paper No 34 of 1996, Government Printer, Suva, 1996) 
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